Re-Assessing resource dependency and criticality. Linking future food and water stress with global resource supply vulnerabilities for foresight analysis by Johnson, Corey & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Re-Assessing resource dependency and criticality.
Linking future food and water stress with global resource
supply vulnerabilities for foresight analysis
Raimund Bleischwitz & Corey M. Johnson &
Michael G. Dozler
Received: 8 July 2013 /Accepted: 29 November 2013
# The Author(s) 2013. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract While strategic studies on natural resources usually
focus on the criticality of certain single materials, our paper
starts from the inter-linkages between and among resources
(called “the resource nexus”). It examines the impact any food
and water stress may have on extraction activities in fragile
states and regions. According to our approach, conflicts are
likely to increase and may escalate in a number of countries,
many of which are of relevance for the global supply of
strategic materials. Future criticality for European and other
industries, thus, is more likely to result from particular regions
surpassing their adaptive capacities, and not mainly from
limited availability or bottlenecks in the supply chain. The
paper first develops a heuristic model of drivers for stress in
resource-rich regions. Applying this approach, our paper then
develops a global three-layered map along the dimensions of
(i) future regional food and water stress, (ii) fragility of
countries, and (iii) resource-rich countries with relevant re-
serves of strategic materials. As a result our paper tentatively
identifies 15 countries at high risk and some 30 other countries
being at relevant risk of causing resource supply disruptions.
The conclusions underline the need to analyse those global
inter-linkages and institutional mechanisms for strategic fu-
tures studies at a regional scale. As this may go beyond the
capacities of actors on commodity markets, our paper also
draws conclusions towards the establishment of an interna-
tional data hub on the global resource nexus and for futures
research. The paper points to some of the long-term implica-
tions of these issues.
Keywords Resource curse . Conflicts . Fragile states . Food
stress .Water stress .Mapping
Introduction
In the winter of 2011, a drought occurred in eastern China’s
wheat-growing region of Henan, Anhui and neighbouring
provinces. Though the decreased wheat production still met
China’s internal demand, China supplied less wheat to global
markets, which resulted in a price spike. This supply disrup-
tion and price increase particularly affected the biggest im-
porter of Chinese wheat, Egypt, where bread prices tripled.
Though the degree to which the high food prices were a
contributing factor to the Arab Spring are difficult to disen-
tangle from many other factors, futures research should put
these events into a wider perspective. It reminds scholars to
the challenges of what Nassim Taleb calls “black swans” [1],
disruptive events that are either unpredictable or very hard for
humans to isolate from among a complicated set of interrelat-
ed causes or mechanisms. Our questions for any Futures 2.0
agenda as outlined by Pang [2] are as follows:
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1. If food and water stress are likely to accelerate in many
parts of the world, what are the socio-economic repercus-
sions in the respective region?
2. Could this lead into a downward spiral of events where
those regions will be put at risk of socio-political
breakdowns?
3. Might such a chain of events “out there” lead to interrup-
tions of supply chains for energy fuels, materials, and pre-
products that are essential for many key technologies
“here”?
These questions are at the heart of our paper. It deals with
such “wicked problems” in an explorative manner [3]. The
aim of our paper is to start developing assessment tools for
futures studies that look at regions and countries along the
three dimensions of (i) future regional food and water stress,
(ii) fragility of governance structures, and (iii) countries with
relevant reserves of strategic materials. We use a number of
different data tools to develop three layers for a mapping
exercise, which then yields tentative results on what countries
can be considered as being at high risks.
Before starting such a mapping exercise, however, our
paper introduces the more recent debate about interconnec-
tions between different resources, what we refer to as the
“resource nexus” [4–8]. The resource nexus is distinct from
the prevailing discussion of critical materials done by the
European Union’s (EU) Raw Materials Initiative or the U.S.
Department of Energy (DoE), both of whom identify priority
materials of concern following more narrow criteria of avail-
ability and access.
Our approach resembles the long-lasting debate about re-
source conflicts and a resource curse , i.e. the institutional
inability to transform natural endowments into economic de-
velopment. However, our paper also contrasts with some
recent outlooks about a potentially bright future of these states
[9, 10]. The fine line between being optimistic and pessimistic
for the future of these countries seems to lie in their adaptive
capacities, i.e. their ability to become resilient to environmen-
tal stress and to manage potential socio-economic stress
drivers. To make this more explicit and useful for futures
research, our paper develops a heuristic model of such drivers
and how they might overshoot the adaptive capacities of
resource-rich societies.
Following this analytical section, this paper undertakes the
mapping exercise as outlined above and identifies 15 coun-
tries that are most at risk for originating resource supply
disruptions. Furthermore, it identifies 30 additional countries
that, given more extreme circumstances, may also be at risk
and impact global resource supplies.
It is important to note that this mapping exercise displays
those countries that, given current conditions and trends, are
likely to be at risk in the near future. Because political,
economic, and resource extraction/production conditions are
rapidly changing, the map only presents a snapshot of vulner-
abilities as they stand now and represents an explorative
foresight methodology that will need to be improved over
time. It does not attempt to predict which countries will have
resource supply disruptions.
The potential applications for futures studies such as these,
however, are numerous. First, our approach adds to existing
literature on both socio-economic country studies and regional
analysis as well as engineering-driven approaches of
analysing geology and industrial value chains. Second, it
initiates long-term oriented strategic studies where more such
interrelations need to be analysed.
Analysis
The resource nexus and impacts of food and water stress
The resource nexus is a conceptual model that illustrates the
interconnections between and among different resources
[Fig. 1 in 4]; in other words, it visually displays that one (or
more) resource is used as an input to produce another resource
[5]. For example, water and electricity (for pumping water) are
necessary resources for producing food, in particular in South
Asia where irrigation-based agriculture prevails.
In addition to the recent debates about a more narrow nexus
between water, food and energy [7], there is also concern
Fig. 1 The global resource nexus. Source : The Global Resource
Nexus [4]
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& Over the nexus with minerals such as phosphorus being
non-substitutable for world food production [11], or the
vast array of resources needed for urbanization and
& Over the nexus with critical minerals such as rare earth,
gallium and lithium being essential to the clean technolo-
gies that are needed to combat climate change [12, 13].
In a more general way, dams illustrate the importance of
considering the resource nexus beyond food, water and energy
in a more comprehensive manner. Usually built to produce
electricity, they require immense quantities of construction
materials and metals, they intervene into hydrological systems
and management regimes, and they impact—often negative-
ly—downstream agriculture. Moreover, many of the dam
projects in upstream states increase political tensions with
downstream states such as in Vietnam, India, Iraq, Egypt
and elsewhere [14].
The resource nexus has become more pressing in recent
years because volatile commodity prices transmit turbulences
from local to global markets faster than ever before [8, 15].
Recent evidence on the dangerous conjunction of high prices
for food and water and social tensions could be witnessed
during the Arab uprisings in 2011. Sternberg [16] points to the
drought that occurred in Northern China as a global trigger
mechanism for higher food prices. Johnstone and Mazo [17]
discuss possible impacts of climate change as stress multi-
pliers. The International Food Policy Research Institute [18]
underlines additional domestic factors such as malnutrition,
the phasing out of food support programs and a high share of
angry young men caring for their families. In a historical
perspective [19] the impact of food prices on the great revo-
lutions in France (1789), Russia (1917), and other civil wars
helps to explain the security dilemmas of the population and
the contingent political outcomes.1
However, the relationship between local water and food
shortages and socio-economic struggle and political unrest is a
complicated one. Our paper does not attempt to add funda-
mental new insights to this debate.Wewill examine the debate
linked to the scope of our paper and derive potential drivers of
a conflict spiral that have been observed in a number of case
studies.
Resources and conflicts: a short survey
It is now common knowledge that both scarcity and abun-
dance of natural resources can be underlying factors in con-
flicts [20–26]. Common pool resources (CPRs) especially,
such as water and land, can foster cooperation if affected
groups manage property rights, limit free access and establish
mechanisms of trust and enforcement, but also lead to conflict
in fragile states [27]. The legal and regulatory contexts around
property rights vary widely across jurisdictions (at the local,
national, regional, and global levels) just as the adaptive
capacities and resilience also varies widely [28]. A key is to
understand the local patterns and their ability to cope with
shocks that are often generated elsewhere such as water short-
ages and food price increases.
Conflict and security literature has focused on what drives
people to become involved in armed conflicts. “Neo-Malthu-
sian” approaches link demographic changes, especially pop-
ulation growth, with resource scarcity, environmental prob-
lems, and increased propensity for violent conflict (e.g.
Homer-Dixon). One may thus derive drivers such as a young
population and malnutrition as preconditions for conflicts. A
second school of thought, represented by the work of Paul
Collier, has been influential because it challenged previously
held assumptions that resource scarcity was the primary driver
of conflict; in fact, abundance is strongly related to the pres-
ence of violent conflict. Abundance creates incentives and
opportunities for looting of resources and making profits of
transporting minerals from remote land-locked areas to ports.
Large-n studies of conflict have identified a correlation be-
tween the proximity to mines, for example, and the level of
violence. These first two types of research usually intermingle
in terms of causation, and are topped with a third strand of
research focused on grievances over ethnic, class, or racial
identity as a cause of conflict [see 20, 29, 30]. From our
perspective, however, usually these studies focus on a limited
number of commodities rather than at the strategic intercon-
nections of the resource nexus. The conclusions drawn by
Humphreys [20], countries dependent on agricultural com-
modities are at political risk independent of their other endow-
ments, and by Carmignani and Avom [31] on negative social
developments resulting from commodity exports is seen as
valid for our heuristic model on drivers (A heuristic model on
drivers of a new vulnerability section). In addition, one may
also derive tendencies of secessionism and incentives for
organized crime to become involved in issuing property rights
as being driven from new discoveries and profits.
Pros and cons about the resource curse—what’s new
The related debate about a potential resource curse has been
alive since the early 1990s with Paul Auty’s seminal paper
[32, see also 33]. The fact that particular oil-exporting coun-
tries had poor economic performances compared to some of
the top-performing emerging economies, such as South Ko-
rea, led to two main explanations:
& Macro-economic deficits of overvaluing a currency in
foreign exchange rates based on the booming resource
extraction sectors while neglecting other sectors as well
as failures to establish a robust fiscal system and to
1 See also ongoing research at the New England Complex Systems
Institute at: http://necsi.edu/research/social/foodprices/updatejuly2012/
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diversify the economy beyond resource extraction
(“Dutch Disease”); and
& Political-institutional deficits of negotiating contracts, cor-
ruption and organizing resource rents for purposes of
social development and infrastructures. This strand of
explanations offers more variables for cross-country com-
parisons and hence appears more complex than macro-
economic issues. Themore recent literature seems to focus
on this aspect.
It is important to acknowledge that the commodity price
hikes since the year 2000 in combination with better policies
have benefited some countries such as Botswana, Chile, and
Kazakhstan. The lessons learned there have been widely
discussed [34–37], and in recent surveys, van der Ploeg
[15], Heinrichs [38] and Di John [39] question the evidence
of any resource curse.
Accordingly, the more recent discussion among academics
and practitioners seems to adopt a slightly more optimistic
view for overcoming the resource curse [9, 10]. Based on the
lessons learned, online tools for better policies are now avail-
able. The “Natural Resource Charter,”2 with its 12 principles
on how to turn the natural endowments into extraction and
development, is such a tool available for resource-rich devel-
oping countries. In addition, a model mining development
agreement3 has been formulated by the Mining Law Commit-
tee of the International Bar Association. In May 2013, Reve-
nue Watch Institute produced the Resource Governance In-
dex4, measuring the quality of governance in the oil, gas, and
mining sector of 58 countries, particularly in Africa and Asia.
The African Mining Countries have developed their own
vision and an action plan.5 These tools, though, overlook the
harsh reality of structural deficits and unfavourable conditions
as well as the obstacle of adapting and applying the tools at the
local level. However, they offer the ingredients from which
countries can start or improve and, in particular, the move
towards greater transparency and less corruption is notable.
In our view, the challenges of the resource nexus are not yet
built into these future policy tools and not yet reflected prop-
erly by research. Climate change and other environmental
impacts will have to be fully incorporated into regional plan-
ning processes, and can be considered game changers for
socio-economic perspectives [40]. The possible cumulative
changes of very large numbers of people over the course of
years, and potentially disruptive impacts on existing institu-
tions are poorly assessed yet. A more critical view of the
aforementioned tools suggests two main weaknesses. Firstly,
the international economic order with volatile commodity
prices and existing distortions such as illicit trade has been
left out. Secondly, destructive tendencies of organized crime,
secessionism, fundamentalism and terrorism may have been
underestimated. This leads to the conclusion that the socio-
economic interconnections between environmental change
and the resource curse should receive wider attention in Fu-
tures 2.0 research and politics.
A heuristic model on drivers of a new vulnerability
A combination of factors at the interface of regional envi-
ronmental change and socio-economic dynamics demands
new models on the adaptive capacities of societies
[41–46]. While we fully acknowledge the enormous chal-
lenges of turning slowly reacting adaptive capacities into
anticipating and pro-active ones, our attempt here is more
moderate: to derive relevant drivers from the debates
above and develop a heuristic model that describes these
new vulnerabilities as challenges for adaptive capacities in
the long-run Fig. 2).
In general terms, we observe two new main challenges.
First, global drivers can overshadow local drivers in the man-
agement of common pool resources such as river basins
management and agriculture. Second, increasing connectivity
allows local turbulences to spread rapidly, with unintended
side-effects on other resources and regions. Thus, fragile
countries and regions are likely to become vulnerable, but
other regions including the industrialized countries will have
to cope with the indirect impacts too. Adaptive capacities will
have to be developed for the directly affected regions and
others more indirectly affected.
The following Fig. 2 distinguishes three more general
stress multipliers: climate change and weather extremes, vol-
atile commodity prices, and population growth from the fol-
lowing drivers at the local and regional level:
& Malnutrition: following the observations about the press-
ing local and national urgency of any food and water
crisis, one may consider malnutrition as an entry point
for socio-economic and political impacts.
& Migration: beyond general issues, this is a key social issue
arising during and after the time when a mine is construct-
ed. Humphreys [20] calls it one of the grievance mecha-
nisms. Rudra and Jensen [47] and Bearce and Laks
Hutnick [48] provide new insights on the nexus between
migration and natural resources.
& Fundamentalism and Terrorism: some regions may adopt
anti-Western attitudes, in particular, if their national gov-
ernment appears to cooperate with them. Natural re-
sources could provide a way to finance rebellions that
have been started for other reasons and may extend the
duration of civil wars; [see, e.g., 49, 50].
2 See: www.naturalresourcecharter.org
3 See: www.mmdaproject.org
4 See: http://www.revenuewatch.org/rgi
5 See: www.africaminingvision.org; see also the Africa Progress Report
2013.
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& Secessionism: this is estimated to be the biggest source of
violent conflicts according to the conflict barometer ac-
cording to the conflict barometer done by Heidelberg
Institute for International Conflict Research [51]) and is
especially relevant for those extraction activities and re-
serves that are located in well-defined areas of a country
with socio-cultural heterogeneity. Sudan may be the most
illustrative case study.
& Organized crime: an issue that starts at a lower level with
vengeance-seeking group grievance but could increasing-
ly involve extraction and trade with conflict-minerals (but
also other natural resources), drugs, and other illicit acti-
vates [see 20, 52, 53]. The cases of Mexico’s drug trade
and Western Africa may be most illustrative.
& Civil wars and severe violations of human rights in gen-
eral: this is especially prominent in those regions that have
long-lasting civil wars such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan,
Aceh/Indonesia where natural resource production is ham-
pered [54] and chances for peace are undermined [55].
The combination of these factors could translate into what
we call a redux of the resource curse: triggered by the emer-
gence of a food and/or water crisis—whatever the causes may
be – local and national governancemechanisms are vulnerable
and may not be able to cope with such a shock. If people start
rioting for access to water and food and if the existing insti-
tutional resilience is low, fragile states and regions will be put
at risk of further instability, where the above-mentioned mech-
anisms might escalate. Any such escalation may then lead to
interruptions of supply chains for essential materials and have
international repercussions.
Many resource-producing countries and regions can be
considered fragile. In particular new resource suppliers in
Africa and Asia that started extracting on a large scale basis
during the boom of the years 2000–2008 and in the aftermath
of the financial crisis have to struggle with basic governance
challenges, including:
& Negotiating fair agreements with extractive industries;
& Managing the switch from the employment-intensive con-
struction period of a mine to the more capital-intensive
extraction period, which usually comes with huge lay-offs;
& Establishing a transportation infrastructure that meets the
needs of broader development purposes and environmen-
tal standards, in particular if the country is land-locked;
& Balancing the needs of the affected local communities
with other regions and the general public (quite often the
population in the capital);
& Establishing a robust fiscal regime with permission grants,
royalties, and rents; and
& Dealing with environmental issues that partly arise
through mining processes but usually have other causes.
In general, such fragile states can hardly be assumed to
comply with international norms for labour safety or environ-
mental protection. Moreover, their institutions are often weak
and have low resilience to stress. According to Paul Collier
[56] a domestic institutional capacity comparable to Portugal
talism
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Fig. 2 Drivers of a new
vulnerability. Source : own
compilation, adopted from The
Global Resource Nexus [4]
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in the 1980s is necessary to embark on a path for inclusive and
sustainable growth. Stress multipliers such as climate change,
volatile commodity prices and pressure from population
growth – factors that are not easily managed by weak
states—further limit capacity-building in fragile states, in-
creasing the risk of violent conflicts. Some of these states
may even fail.
Such drivers of a new vulnerability may not only occur
within those states that are currently considered fragile but
also within authoritarian regimes (e.g. in Asia or Latin Amer-
ica, or the Russian type of democracy), where resource reve-
nues help to maintain political structures. The lessons learned
from countries such as Egypt and Libya might be that such
countries may be more fragile than observers believe, with
inappropriate “extractive institutions” [57] and the mecha-
nisms explained above leading into conflicts and a new re-
source curse. Exploring this and putting it into anymapping is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper.
The mapping
Methodology of mapping countries
To map countries worldwide where the resource nexus could
affect governance and resource supplies, the following three
exercises were carried out:
1. Mapping possible future agricultural and water stress to
determine where there is a likelihood of a food and water
crisis break-out;
2. Mapping today’s fragile states and regional political in-
stabilities; and
3. Mapping the future reserves of fuels and minerals, partic-
ularly those of critical importance for future supply.
The resulting “Global Resource Supply Vulnerabilities”
map (Fig. 3) is, therefore, actually a composite of three un-
derlying maps.
& Step I: Mapping Agricultural and Water Stress
The first layer uses information from the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to
identify the agricultural systems at risk from future envi-
ronmental impacts such as extreme weather events and
climate change, natural conditions, and disasters [58].
These risks include floods/sea-level rises, water scarcity,
pollution, loss of biodiversity, deforestation, desertification/
droughts, loss/low soil fertility, erosion, and land scarcity.
States facing environmental risk may not be able to achieve
sustainable levels of food andwater resources. Such risks as
water and land scarcitymay also compromise the extraction
and production of minerals and energy resources.With new
assessments coming up (such as the forthcoming Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change reports) more detailed
analyses can be undertaken.
& Step II: Mapping Political Instability
The second layer measures each state’s political insta-
bility. Using information from the Fund for Peace’s Failed
States Index, states are grouped into five categories: fail-
ing, fragile, troubled, moderate, and stable [59]. The Fund
for Peace ranks states based on the following conditions:
mounting demographic pressures, massive movement of
refugees or internally displaced persons, vengeance-
seeking group grievances, chronic and sustained human
flight, uneven economic development, poverty or sharp/
severe economic decline, legitimacy of the state, progres-
sive deterioration of public services, violations of human
rights and rule of law, security apparatus, rise of
factionalized elites, and intervention of external actors.
While we acknowledge the limitations of the categories
and data sources used by the Fund for Peace, for the
purposes of this map political instability is used as a proxy
for understanding a state’s ability to effectively manage
the extraction, production, consumption, and export of its
food, water, energy, and mineral resources. Note that the
mechanisms above are close to these indicators, though
our scope is closer on the resource nexus.
& Step III: Mapping Reserves of Minerals for Future Supply
Naturally, a map displaying nexus points of resource
supply risks must also consider where the world’s natural
resources are located. This layer provides information
about each state’s reserves of key natural resources. These
include fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas), base metals
(iron ore, bauxite and alumina, copper), and critical ele-
ments (rare earth elements, cobalt, lithium, manganese,
nickel, indium, gallium, tellurium). The fuels and minerals
considered are critical to many aspects of developed and
developing economies. Oil is essential to transportation,
base metals to construction, and so on. The other elements
are considered critical for their importance for future tech-
nologies (especially green ones) according to both the
U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) and the European
Union (EU). Reserve estimates were obtained from the
United States Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodity
Summaries [60].
Once the information for each layer was compiled, they
were overlapped to see where all three factors meet. That
means, for example, that even though Canada and Aus-
tralia have significant resource reserves, they are neither
politically unstable nor at significant risk for environmen-
tal stress to warrant inclusion of at-risk states.
After identifying the approximately 45 countries that
showed resource supply vulnerabilities, the last step was
to identify the most at-risk states. For each state, we scored
the severity of political instability, the severity of
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environmental stressors, and the amount of commod-
ity reserves on a scale of 0–3 (3 being the highest).
The scores for the three categories were added for a
total score between 0 and 9. Zambia, for example,
received a score of 8, while Mexico received a 5.
Those states with the highest scores were grouped
into the high-risk states and the remaining countries
were grouped as those at relevant risk. The rankings
appear on the map next to each state or in the table
below it.
The global resource supply vulnerabilities map
The following map displays the countries at risk of not being
able to supply essential resources to global markets in the near
Fig. 3 The global resource supply vulnerability map. Source : own compilation (Not all countries were considered for inclusion on the map for reasons
of obvious political stability, known lack of resource reserves, or minimal threat of environmental stress)
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future. States are divided into two categories: high-risk and
relevant-risk. This map originated as part of a report of the
Transatlantic Academy [4] on the global resource nexus and
the intersection of markets, international politics, and human
security.
The highest risk countries (see Table 1) include Afghani-
stan, Algeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimba-
bwe. These countries share a high degree of political instabil-
ity and environmental stress, and they also hold enormous fuel
and/or mineral reserves.
Thirty additional countries are identified as “relevant
risks,” meaning they risk causing disruptions to global re-
source supplies but, if they do, not to the same degree as the
high-risk states. These states are much more geographically
diverse and their conditions vary widely. Consider the exam-
ples of Chile and Angola. Chile has a stable democratic
government with large amounts of natural resources, especial-
ly copper. However, its long coast and diverse terrain as well
as water shortages in the mining areas make it susceptible to
the type of environmental stress that could restrict supplying
the resources to global markets. On the other hand, Angola
faces less environmental stress, but the political instability
there threatens to disrupt resource supply nonetheless. Over-
all, the risk from these countries is relevant to interested
stakeholders, but not of the highest degree. One should also
consider that such risk factors could occur at a regional scale
within large countries such as Brazil, Mexico, India, Russia,
China, and others.
To highlight the importance of the countries at highest risk,
they are included on the map in red along with markers of the
severity of environmental stress and political instability and
the level of resource reserves. The countries at relevant risk are
shown in yellow, and their data information is included in the
table below the map.
Discussion of the results and relevance
The results of our mapping process are striking. In total, the
likelihood of interruptions of international supply chains is
quite significant. On top of that, we made two more
observations:
& Sub-state or cross-boundary regions could experience sup-
ply disruptions in large states that may not otherwise be
regarded as fragile (e.g. Aceh/Indonesia, Northern
Caucasus/Russia, Northern Mexico); and
& Risks of regional international resource-related conflicts
in areas such as the Chinese Seas [see 4] should also be
figured in.
At a lower risk level, stress caused by the resource
nexus also leads to cross-boundary tensions, irrational
supply strategies and international distortions. Hence, the
risks for international markets could become quite severe.
Table 1 Countries at high risk and their relevance
Country Relevance
Afghanistan Major resource endowments (e.g. lithium)
estimated to be near US $1 trillion; long-
lasting war and civil war; large drug producer
Algeria Major producer of natural gas
Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Major endowments of copper, diamonds, and
critical minerals; long-lasting civil war in
eastern portions of the state
Guinea Major endowments in bauxite (aluminium) and
iron ore
Indonesia Major producer of forest products and
agricultural goods (e.g. bio-fuels) as well as
fuels (natural gas), nickel, copper and
aluminium ores; vulnerable to sea level rise
and climate change; secessionist conflicts;
strategic position at the Strait of Malacca
Iran Major producer of natural gas and oil; regional
de-stabilizer
Iraq Major producer of natural gas and oil; long-
lasting war and civil war
Libya Major producer of gas and oil; recent civil war
Nigeria Major producer of oil, including major off-shore
oil reserves; recent political changes towards
democracy
Sierra Leone Major reserves of bauxite (aluminium)
Somaliaa Holds strategic position near the Strait of
Hormuz
Sudan, South Sudanb Major producer of oil; currently in armed
conflict about disputed areas, including oil
fields; plans to erect dams for agricultural use
along parts of the Nile River that may put
downstream countries at risk of water
shortages
Yemen Severe water shortages; home of terrorists;
strategic position at the Strait of Hormuz
Zambia Major producer of copper, major endowments in
coal and cobalt
Zimbabwe Major reserves in coal and lithium; relevant
producer of platinum
Source: authors’ compilation
a Note on Somalia and Somaliland: In this paper Somaliland is considered
to be a legal part of Somalia, since Somaliland does not have internation-
ally recognized independence. Furthermore, the data for political stability,
agricultural stressors, and resource reserves does not consider the two
entities separately. Therefore, on the map, the designation between So-
malia and Somaliland is shown with a dotted line, but the data and
evaluation does not distinguish between the two.
b Note on Sudan and South Sudan: The data for this paper comes from
before South Sudan’s separation from Sudan proper in July 2011. There-
fore, for the purposes of this paper, assessments of Sudan and South
Sudan’s political stability, agricultural stressors, and resource reserves
were considered as a unified Sudan. When new data for the two separate
countries becomes available, new risk assessments should be made in
which case both countries may not necessarily be at high risk.
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Data uncertainties
Without question, the political, environmental, and resource
supply future remains uncertain. This report acknowledges the
many scientific and behavioural uncertainties inherent in looking
to future possibilities in resource supplies. Despite those uncer-
tainties, by using themost recent data on the different dimensions
of the resource nexus from multiple sources together we have
taken a first step in producing a more comprehensive look into
the interplay among factors influencing a state’s ability to supply
resources to global markets. Furthermore, our hope is that our
analysis and mapping exercise will result in further research that
produces data specifically related to the resource nexus and its
impact on the resource curse.
Uncertainties in food/water stress
Data on possible future food and water stress were taken from
the FAO based on recent estimations of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other sources. Besides
the obvious scientific uncertainties there is also the uncertainty
about future demands for water and food as well as future
diets. Much here will depend on how Asia will manage its
irrigation-based agriculture, whether China might change into
becoming a large-scale food importer, and what diet patterns
the emerging middle class across the globe will develop.
Uncertainties in political stability
Many organizations and groups assess the fragility of states
using different criteria, but often with similar methodologies
and findings.6 The Fund for Peace provides one of the most
comprehensive measurements of political stability through
data on 12 primary social, political, and economic indicators
for 177 countries. Data on political stability is though, by its
nature, only a snapshot of current trends and does not provide
a good basis for predicting political stability in the near-,
middle-, or long-term. A measure of political stability for
Egypt in 2008, for example, would not have predicted the
Arab Spring of 2010. Our analysis, however, is concerned
most with countries experiencing chronic or severe political
instability, which can be seen in fragile state indices over time.
Using the available data, then, we can identify those states
with the greatest instability with some confidence.
Uncertainties on reserve estimates
Reserve estimates usually carry a number of uncertainties. In
the most basic terms, exploration is a risky and cyclical
business, with asymmetric information between some consul-
tants and companies on the one hand and the public on the
other. Africa, especially, is a continent where, due to political
turbulences, not much exploration has been done until very
recently. The African Mining Vision (AMV), which African
leaders adopted in 2009, recognizes the crucial need to
strengthen efforts towards exploration. Thus, an optimistic
perspective would assume more reserves to be discovered.
On the other hand, material and geological science tends to be
cautious and not assume large discoveries in the near future.
Offshore reserves are another source of uncertainties. Recent
oil discoveries tend to speak in favour of optimists, but costs
of production (including environmental and safety costs),
regulatory uncertainties, and risks of inter-state conflicts over
access and production-sharing agreements should also not be
underestimated.
Comparative institutional analysis and challenges
across scale and time
The challenges to govern natural resources in a sustainable
manner while acknowledging their inter-linkages and inter-
generational fairness are enormous. Since administrations and
institutions are usually centred along one specific resource
(think about ministries for agriculture and water treaties),
establishing cross-divisional capacities will have to climb up
on the governance agenda. Long-term planning that is usually
discounted against short-term benefits both in politics and in
businesses should be strengthened. In addition, governments
need to build resilient institutions (i.e., institutions that are
able to cope with price shocks and extreme weather events).
Recalling disasters such as the nuclear accident in Fukushima,
Japan (2011); the Deep Water Horizon oil spill, Gulf of
Mexico (2010); Hurricane Katrina, Southern United States
(2005); and the heat wave in central Europe (2003) it appears
that even in well-developed countries mechanisms for such
6 Most measures of fragile or failing states are rooted in and build upon
the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals, which are the eight
areas of international development that all UN members committed to
achieving by 2015. They include eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;
achieving universal primary education; promoting gender equality and
empowering women; reducing child mortality rates; improving maternal
health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensuring
environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for
development. Thus, most indices of fragile states measure a state’s ability
to achieve these goals because they reflect the relative strength and
control a state has over formal and informal institutions, security, and
society. The World Bank, for example, defines “fragile situations” using
two criteria: a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score
and the presence of UN and/or regional peace-keeping/building missions.
The second criterion though, in particular, places more emphasis on
violent conflict as a measure of a state’s fragility. Many other organiza-
tions, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, identify and work with fragile states, without generating their own
lists of which states are considered “fragile.” The Overseas Development
Institute, a British think tank, for example, provides analysis and policy
guidance on aid, delivery of human services, human security, poverty, and
crisis response in dealing with fragile states but does not distinguish
which countries are considered fragile. The Global Peace Index as well
as the Food Security Index also provide useful data and analysis.
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institutional resilience are lacking or ineffective. Coping with
food and water crises in developing countries along with other
stress factors, therefore, will need new and additional research;
futures research will have to assess the near-term and long-term
risks along the inter-linkages as outlined in this paper and it will
have to develop tools for enhancing the adaptive capacities of
industries and societies. In doing so it will likely follow polycen-
tric approaches that look at cross-regional capacities from a
bottom-up perspective [61] rather than a global system gover-
nance perspective. This is a challenge across scale and time:
& Transparency and accountability, usually seen as clear-cut
correlations, will have to accept indirect dynamics where
demand from end-users far away triggers unwanted effects
in remote areas. Thus, the polluter-pays-principle from
environmental policy and international law needs to be
converted into a more general and binding responsibility
for materials along their value chains and within regional
environmental boundaries. Actors to be involved com-
prise regional and national authorities with assessment
capacities, key industries, and concerned stakeholders.
& The cumulative causation of decisions and their impacts
go beyond the traditional risk criteria of availability of
resources and access. It would be far too simple to con-
clude from geological surveys that if the availability is for
more than one generation and if the access can be
safeguarded by a legal order future generations wouldn’t
have to suffer. The precautionary principle needs to be
translated into principles for sustainable resource manage-
ment at the level of countries that help to maintain the
most relevant resource functions over time.
Conclusions
In the future, the global resource nexus will likely put all
countries under stress. This paper underlines a risk that is just
emerging: a spiral of resource-driven conflicts that may be
triggered through regional food and water crises and escalate
into socio-economic breakdowns with subsequent interrup-
tions of supply chains for materials. The foresight exercise
of our mapping process has revealed the result that, based on
current evidence, 15 countries can be considered at high risk,
while additional 30 countries will also face serious challenges.
Thus, this is a major challenge for futures research to assess
those dynamics and their impacts.
Future analysis should certainly address the critical uncer-
tainties that have been highlighted, including data needs, and
undertake sensitivity analyses to validate findings. Our map is
a preliminary exercise and we hope that this work will inspire
more thorough research into the intersection of agricultural
and water stress, political stability, and resource management.
These uncertainties, nevertheless, should not hinder relevant
actors to draw conclusions and to re-assess risks.
With regard to the futures research on adaptive capacities,
our paper adds insights to a multi-level approach. While the
local and regional level is important for managing resources
and resilience, the country-based institutions are essential as
back-up mechanisms that could either mitigate or escalate a
serious crisis.With regard to the international level, our analysis
contingency planning, suggests analysing a strengthening of
regional trans-boundary cooperation and of international rela-
tions along material flows and supply chains. In other words,
issues such as virtual water flows from trade, the energy-
intensity of food commodities, and the ‘ecological rucksacks’
of materials [62] will become more relevant if their institutional
dimension is incorporated.
Yet, prevailing criticality assessments (e.g., in the US and the
EU) end with a few priority materials of concern. Our approach
suggests that at least two new assessment criteria should be
added to those of geology and supply chain concentrations:
firstly, environmental risks and its impacts stemming from the
global resource nexus and, secondly, socio-economic risks at the
level of supplying countries. It is here where futures research
should play a strong role: the development of an international
data hub on those issues with foresight tools, comparative anal-
ysis on choice architects within and across administrations who
facilitate foresight processes, and nudges such as interactive
maps that help decision-makers to reduce complexity. In the long
run, a global model on resource flows at the intersection of
environmental change and socio-economic development would
be needed, that helps resource-rich countries to manage their
endowments while Europe and the rest of the OECD/G20 would
invest in adaptive capacities worldwide.
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